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The concept of moral hazard is most easily
explained in the context of insurance. The very
existence of insurance may change the behavior
of the insured person, who becomes less careful
in taking care of insured property than he other-
wise would if the property were uninsured. Being
less careful with others’ property than your own
is not moral behavior and is a hazard to the insur-
ance company.
Some claim that Federal Reserve policy
responses to financial market developments
should be regarded as “bailing out” market par-
ticipants and creating moral hazard by doing so.
In my view, this argument is incorrect because
there is a benefit rather than a hazard to sound
monetary policy that stabilizes the economy.
Consider a monetary policy that maintains
low and stable inflation. If market participants
have confidence in the continued success of that
policy, then they need not structure their activities
to be robust against a serious outbreak of inflation.
Monetary policy does change behavior, but it is
not a hazard to the economy that firms and house-
holds make their plans on the assumption of
continuing price stability. Indeed, one of the
arguments for price level stability is precisely
that markets will work better and private deci-
sions will be more efficient than in an environ-
ment of price level instability. Outcomes are more
efficient because behavior changes in response
to the environment of price level stability.
T
here are two ways to view the question
that comprises the title for this panel
discussion. One concerns the potential
for moral hazard issues to decrease
stability. The other is the extent to which, cur-
rently, the issue in actuality has decreased sta-
bility or raised a problem for the Federal
Reserve. The potential is clearly enormous.
However, I believe that in the macroeconomic
policy sphere, actual moral hazard problems
today are relatively minor with the exception of
a small number of large financial institutions
whose managements and investors believe they
can count on government assistance should
these firms find themselves in deep trouble.
Before continuing, and although I have
attended my last FOMC meeting, I need to empha-
size that the views I express here are mine and
do not necessarily reflect official positions of the
Federal Reserve System. I thank my colleagues
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their
comments, but I retain full responsibility for
errors.
MORAL HAZARD IN MONETARY
POLICY
I addressed moral hazard in monetary policy
in a speech at the Cato Institute last November,
“Market Bailouts and the ‘Fed Put.’”1 Let me
repeat the gist of that argument.
1 1 http://www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2007/11_30_07.html.The same argument holds for monetary policy
actions that serve to stabilize financial markets
in the face of market turmoil of the sort that broke
out last August. A monetary policy response to
market turmoil is an application to modern finan-
cial markets of the traditional function of the
central bank as a lender of last resort to the bank-
ing system. A belief that Federal Reserve policy
actions will serve to stabilize the financial system
will affect behavior, but not on the whole in a
hazardous way. This validity of this assertion is
less obvious than the case for price level stability;
I will argue the case.
When financial markets are generally stable,
many firms will decide that they can get along
with less capital. All else equal, higher leverage
obviously increases risk. Should there be a shock,
a firm with less capital is more likely to have dif-
ficulty. However, in the more stable financial
environment, shocks are less common and less
severe when they do occur. If that were not the
case, we would not describe the situation as being
“a more stable financial environment.”
However, whatever the degree of financial
stability, nothing protects an individual firm from
its mistakes. The Fed’s actions in recent months
have not prevented many financial firms from
having to write down the value of billions of
dollars’ worth of assets. Fed actions have been
successful in helping to protect the financial
system without protecting any particular firm.
A number of hedge funds and mortgage brokers
have gone under without a finger of public support
being lifted to save them. That is as it should be.
Lenders have foreclosed on thousands of
homeowners in default on their mortgages and
have forced the former owners to leave their
homes. So far, we have not seen significant govern-
ment funds being supplied to prevent foreclosures,
although proposals for such support are common.
The public debate on this issue seems pretty
healthy to me. People understand the anguish of
foreclosure but also the potential moral hazard
from bailing out homeowners who took out
mortgages they could not afford or from bailing
out investors who made loans they should not
have made. There is also a widespread belief
among homeowners who are meeting their finan-
cial obligations that it would be unfair for the
government to bail out “irresponsible” borrowers
when responsible ones, perhaps with consider-
able struggle, are meeting their obligations.
As an aside, it seems to me that most of those
advocating some sort of government action are
supporting relatively narrowly drawn proposals
that do not apply to investor-owned houses and
to properties already in foreclosure. Whether or
not a sound proposal can be enacted that avoids
creating moral hazard remains to be seen, but
current public debate is sensitive to the issue.
TOO BIG TO FAIL
In the context of macroeconomic stability,
the main moral hazard issue arises in the context
of “too big to fail.” I believe that it was Alan
Greenspan who put the issue this way: No firm
should be too big to fail but some may be too big
to liquidate quickly. Suppose a large firm gets
into trouble and the potential adverse conse-
quences for stability are so great that intervention
is unavoidable. In that situation, any intervention
ought to take a form such that the costs to share-
holders and management are so large that no firm
in the future will want to allow itself to fall into
such a situation. Lest I be regarded as a soft touch
when I say that a situation could arise that could
make intervention “inevitable,” I would set a
very high bar to any intervention. Here is what I
think is sound advice: “Experience suggests that
the path of wisdom is to use monetary policy
explicitly to offset other disturbances only when
they offer a ‘clear and present danger.’” Some may
be surprised to learn that the author of this sen-
tence was Milton Friedman in his presidential
address to the American Economic Association
in 1967.2
In recent months, some boards of directors
have forced out their CEOs and companies have
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2 The American Economic Review, March 1968, 58, p. 14.raised new capital, diluting the ownership posi-
tion of existing shareholders. I am sure that these
costs will not be lost on future managements, but
it remains to be seen how long recent pain remains
in managers’ memories. In any event, we are for-
tunate that in the current episode, so far anyway,
no large financial firms have been so weakened
by large losses that they were unable to raise new
capital.
We have known for many years that moral
hazard is a potentially serious issue. If a firm
believes that it will be bailed out if it gets into
trouble, that expectation encourages excessive
risk-taking and increases the probability of trouble.
There are two complementary ways to deal with
moral hazard. First, firms in trouble ought not to
be bailed out, unless the bailout takes a form that
imposes heavy costs on managers and share-
holders. Second, firms subject to government
regulation ought to be compelled to maintain
adequate capital to reduce the probability of fail-
ure. U.S. banks entered the period of turmoil last
year pretty well capitalized and have been able
to withstand large losses.
I am more skeptical of the financial strength
of the GSEs, and believe that we could see sub-
stantial problems in that sector. According to the
S&P Case-Shiller home value data released earlier
this week, as of December 2007 average prices
had declined by 15 percent or more over the past
12 months in Phoenix, San Diego, Miami and
Las Vegas. We can add Detroit to the danger list
as the home price index for that city is down by
almost 19 percent over the 24 months ending
December 2007. With house prices falling signifi-
cantly in a number of large markets, many prime
mortgages issued a few years ago with a loan-to-
value ratio of 80 percent may now have relatively
little homeowner equity, which increases the
probability of default and amount of loss in event
of default.
As I emphasized some time ago, GSE losses
will depend on the variance as well as the mean
of changes in national home prices. Losses in
markets with home prices falling more than the
national average will not be offset by gains in
markets with price changes above the national
average. I do not have a new message here; we
have known for a long time that advance prepa-
ration and a strong balance sheet are the keys to
riding out a financial storm. As I have empha-
sized before, the Federal Reserve can deal with
liquidity pressures but cannot deal with solvency
issues. I do not have any information on the GSEs
that the market does not also have. Nevertheless,
in assessing the risk of further credit disruptions
this year, I would put the GSEs at the top of my
list of sources of potentially serious problems. If
those problems were realized, they would be a
direct result of moral hazard inherent in the cur-
rent structure of the GSEs.
MORAL HAZARD RISKS TO
ECONOMIC STABILITY
The title of this session starts with the word
“balancing.” Monetary policy is a balancing act,
with dangers of recession and inflation both very
real. My view, oft stated, is that the FOMC should
give primacy to the inflation objective, because,
if inflation develops while the FOMC is concen-
trating on avoiding recession, the consequence
will be to delay recession but not to avoid it. And,
most likely, the delayed recession in an environ-
ment of rising inflation and rising inflation expec-
tations will be worse than the mild recession
avoided in the immediate future.
The FOMC’s “prime concern,” though, must
not be confused with “exclusive concern.” The
FOMC has good reason to respond to employment
problems and doing so need not be inconsistent
with maintaining an environment of price stabil-
ity. Of course, different observers have different
views as to whether the FOMC is striking the
right balance, but the need to strike the balance
ought not to be at issue.
The traditional monetary policy problem of
balancing inflation and employment risks is
seriously complicated when an event raising a
moral hazard problem intervenes. When an event
occurs risking extreme financial instability, the
best course of action is probably for policymakers
to keep the ship afloat and worry about the com-
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firm to keep the ship afloat, the aim should be to
allow as much pain as possible to flow through
to management and investors to discourage
future risky behavior. To avoid a future inflation
problem, monetary policy accommodation, which
may be a part of the policy response, should be
reversed promptly when the markets settle down.
Since World War II, the number of financial
upsets is so few that we do not have a large sam-
ple from which we can draw lessons as to better
and worse ways of handling the aftermath of
financial turmoil. With the benefit of hindsight—
and the importance of the word “hindsight”
should be emphasized—it is not hard to argue
that the FOMC was too slow to raise the federal
funds target after taking the target down to 1 per-
cent in 2003. I also believe that, with hindsight,
the FOMC was too slow to start raising the fed
funds target in 1999 after dropping it by 75 basis
points to deal with the turmoil created by Long
Term Capital Management. The problem in these
episodes, however, was not related to moral haz-
ard but to policy judgments of the usual sort of
trying to strike the right balance between inflation
and unemployment concerns.
THE CURRENT EPISODE OF
FINANCIAL TURMOIL
We are currently living through an episode
that will provide considerable evidence on sev-
eral important questions. In five years or so, we
will see whether the FOMC withdrew cuts in the
fed funds rate target on an appropriate schedule.
The current episode will also provide evi-
dence on a vexing issue of causation. As Greenlaw
et al. emphasize in their very interesting paper,
the relation of finance to the real economy has
long been a puzzle because of the difficulty of
sorting out cause and effect. There is a large litera-
ture on this issue. One tradition flows from
Friedman-Schwartz, and, before them, the work
of Irving Fisher, relating fluctuations in money
growth to the business cycle. Greenlaw et al. report
evidence on the relation of growth in domestic
non-financial debt to growth in real GDP.
Although there have been a number of inter-
esting efforts, no one has come up with a really
convincing model of why fluctuations in nominal
magnitudes should cause fluctuations in real
magnitudes. A contrary view, also with an exten-
sive literature, flows from work on real business
cycles. From this perspective, the business cycle
is a real phenomenon and nominal magnitudes
are along for the ride. In the real business cycle
model, causation runs from the business cycle to
nominal financial magnitudes.
My own work has been within the Friedman-
Schwartz tradition. I do not have any doubt that
monetary policy mistakes can create recession.
In trying to sort out the causality between money
and output, Friedman emphasized the importance
of evidence from natural experiments. I think it
useful to think about that same approach in ana-
lyzing the current situation in the credit markets.
We are dealing with something close to a natural
experiment because the turmoil spreading from
the subprime mortgage market was clearly unan-
ticipated and, for the economy outside housing,
basically exogenous and not closely related to
changes in monetary policy. We are living through
an episode that is as close as we have seen to a
pure credit disturbance without an accompanying
monetary disturbance.
Let me develop this theme a bit more care-
fully. The FOMC did, of course, raise the target
federal funds rate from 1 percent in mid-2004 to
5.25 percent in mid-2006. The effect of rising
interest rates in slowing mortgage finance was
not a surprise; nor was a slowing in home price
appreciation a surprise. In the quarters before
August 2007, we did not observe a marked decline
in money growth or any of the other usual symp-
toms of a monetary disturbance.
The growing scale of defaults of subprime
mortgages in the spring and summer of 2007 was
a surprise. I think it reasonable to regard the
effects of these defaults on credit markets beyond
the mortgage market as an exogenous credit dis-
turbance—perhaps as exogenous as we get in our
discipline. The issue at hand is whether this dis-
turbance will cause a significant contraction in
economic activity outside housing.
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is obvious that this particular sector is overbuilt.
The U.S. economy has experienced problems in
particular sectors before, such as steel and agri-
culture in early 1980s. Those problems lingered
after recovery from the 1981-82 recession began
but did not prevent the recovery.
Weakness in investment in residential struc-
tures has been holding down GDP growth in a
significant manner since the second quarter of
2006 but, through the last quarter of 2007, was
not sufficient to push growth of GDP excluding
housing below 1.5 percent. The issue is whether
the credit market problems will have a signifi-
cant adverse impact outside housing. By way of
comparison, the shock of 9/11 had a quick and
large impact; firms shed one million jobs in
October, November and December of 2001. We
have not yet seen an effect of credit turmoil on
real activity of this magnitude.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I suspect that the origin of this panel topic
was the view that a central bank response to
market turmoil creates moral hazard. A general-
ized monetary policy response, in the form of
the FOMC cutting the target federal funds rate, is
completely unlike the effects of government flood
insurance on homeowners. Flood insurance will
compensate the homeowner, period. A monetary
policy response may or may not occur at a time
when a financial firm gets into trouble and may
or may not be adequate to prevent a firm from
failing.
Moreover, a financial firm cannot expect tar-
geted aid for just the firms in trouble. An exception
to this general statement is that, unfortunately,
the GSEs probably can expect targeted aid. Thus,
putting the GSEs aside because they might get
assistance directly from Congress, expectation of
a monetary policy response to financial turmoil
is completely unlike the situation faced by the
homeowner with underpriced flood insurance.
Many homeowners do build houses in areas
where they would not build if they were totally
responsible for losses, or had to buy insurance in
a competitive market. Financial firms, on the other
hand, cannot expect aid if they build on the
financial flood plain. And that is as it should be.
NOTE
Because this is a panel discussion, this text
should be regarded as preliminary; I may add
some comments reflecting earlier discussion at
the forum.
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